

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

29 January 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: WIE-27/1: CHINESE COMMUNIST
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions
with respect to Taiwan through mid-1952.

ASSUMPTION

A truce has not been concluded in Korea.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION

A. What Chinese Communist Forces are now in position for operations
against Taiwan?

G-2

1. Ground Forces

a. Strength

b. Disposition

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c. Combat effectiveness

with particular reference to
specialized units such as amphibious and air-
borne units

A-2

2. Air Forces

a. Strength

b. Disposition

c. Combat effectiveness

d. Airlift capabilities

ONI

3. Naval Forces

a. Strength

b. Disposition

c. Combat effectiveness

d. Waterlift capability

G-2
ONI
A-2

B. Under present circumstances (i.e., continuation of the war
in Korea, present requirements for internal security, and
present scale and nature of Chinese Communist commitment
in Southeast Asia) what additional forces could the Chi-
nese Communists make available for an assault on Taiwan?

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C-2, ONI, A-2 C. What gaps are apparent in Chinese Communist capabilities?

C-2, ONI, A-2
OIR 1. To what extent can and will the USSR compensate for these deficiencies?

C-2, ONI, A-2 D. On the basis of points A, B, and C above, what could be the scale and nature of a maximum Chinese Communist effort within the next six months?

1. Strength and composition
2. Most feasible season for utilization of this force
3. Capability for achieving surprise
4. Capability for reinforcement and resupply

OIR E. What are Chinese Communist capabilities for infiltration of Taiwan prior to the assault?

II. THE CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION

C-2, ONI, A-2 A. What is the strength, disposition, composition, and combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Armed Forces?
(Review contributions to SE-20)

OIR (Defense) B. What are the factors in the political and economic situation on Taiwan that affect the capabilities of the Nationalist Armed Forces? How do these factors affect the Armed Forces?

OIR (Defense) C. What is the scope and nature of the Chinese Communist subversive effort on Taiwan? How does this effort affect Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?

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III. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON
TAIWAN

A. What are Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?

G-2, ONI, A-2

1. Against a medium Chinese Communist effort as envisioned in I,D above?

G-2, ONI, A-2

2. Against limited surprise attacks?

G-2, ONI, A-2

- B. What is the scope and nature of assistance the Nationalists would require for the successful defense of Taiwan?

OIR
(Defense)

IV. HOW DO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INFLUENCE CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

- A. Over-all Soviet policy
- B. Present US policy vis-a-vis Taiwan
- C. Possible US counter-action (e.g. attacks against mainland targets)
- D. The Korean situation
 1. Tactical
 2. Truce Negotiations
- E. Possible reactions in non-Communist areas in the Far East

V. WHAT ARE THE INDICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

G-2, ONI, A-2

- A. Military Preparations
- B. Domestic Propaganda

OIR

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OIR C. Foreign Propaganda

OIR D. UN Negotiations

All E. Other

All VI. WHAT ARE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

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